Recent Cases: Constitutional Law. Elections. Registration Statutes. Negro Suffrage by Editors, Law Review
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
seems to prevail.28 The result of the land cases is more doubtful;29 but it is believed
that even in this situation the same doctrines will be ultimately applied, since the
defendant may always question the jurisdiction of the original court by appeal to the
Supreme Court if necessary.
The court also leaves undecided the question of whether the doctrine of resjudicata
will be applied where the jurisdictional question was not actually contested. The
decided cases present a maze of conflicting holdings. Some invoke the classical ap-
proach,3o while others reach opposite results by the use of special grounds of estoppel
of record,3x and presumptions of conclusiveness of judgments by courts of general
jurisdiction.32 If the jurisdiction is not contested, additional theoretical difficulties are
encountered, for a recognition of the original decree as valid would allow the parties
to determine the jurisdiction of the court by their collusive conduct, contrary to
statutory and constitutional enactments;3 where contested, there is, in addition, a
judicial determination of the jurisdictional question. Dean Gavit presents an in-
genious solution by treating a judgment outside the jurisdiction of the court as a bind-
ing arbitration, thus leaving undisturbed the jurisdictional concept of a void judicial
judgment.34 In view of the trend toward simplified procedure3s and a wider applica-
tion of the doctrine that all available defenses must be presented at the first op-
portunity,36 it would not be surprising to find the Supreme Court applying the doctrine
of res judicata to all questions which might have been raised in the original action,
including jurisdictional objections. Of course, in case of default any attempt to pre-
vent collateral attack would violate the due process clause.37
Constitutional Law-Elections-Registration Statutes-Negro Suffrage-[Fed-
eral].-The plaintiff, a Negro, sued to recover damages from the defendants, election
officials and county judge, for having, because of his race and color, prevented his
28 Davis v. Davis, 59 S. Ct. 3 (1938); noted in 6 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 290 (1939); Chamblin v.
Chamblin, 362 Ill. 588, x N.E. (2d) 73 (1936). Cf. Andrews v. Andrews, i88 U.S. 14 (i902).
See also Harper, The Validity of Void Divorces, 79 U. of Pa. L. Rev. i58 (1930).
29 Forsyth v. Hammond, i66 U.S. 5o6 (i896); Carpenter v. Strange, 141 U.S. 87 (i891);
Dowell v. Applegate, i52 U.S. 327 (1894); Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. i (i9o9); Norris v. Loyd,
183 Iowa io56, i68 N.W. 557 (i918); Farmers Nat'l Bank v. Daggett, 2 S.W. (2d) 834
(Comm'n of App. Tex. X928).
3' Thompson v. Whitman, i8 Wall. (U.S.) 457 (1873). See note 2o supra.
3' Smolinsky v. Federal Reserve Life Ins. Co., 126 Kan. 5o6, 268 Pac. 830 (1928); Rice v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 152 Ark. 498, 238 S.W. 772 (1922). Cf. Thompson v. Whitman,
i8 Wall. (U.S.) 457 (1873). See also Farrier, op. cit. supra note 9, at 556.
32 See note 13 supra.
33 Gavit, op. cit. supra note 6, at 389.
34Id., at 39o. 3s See note 22 supra.
36Resiudicata has been extended to bar a subsequent action in a separate cause of action
which "might have been adjudicated" under the procedural provisions for the joinder of
actions, the "fusion" of the action and the assertion of a cross-claim. See Gavit, The Code
Cause of Action, Joinder and Counter-Claims, 30 Col. L. Rev. 802 (1930).
37Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877); Old Wayne Life Ass'n v. McDonough, 204 U.S.
8 (1907).
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registration and thereby his voting at the general election, of November, 1934. The
plaintiff alleged that the defendants were acting pursuant to a conspiracy and under
color of the Oklahoma registration statute,2 which, he contends, violates the Four-
teenth and Fifteenth Amendments, and the laws enacted pursuant thereto,3 and the
Constitution of Oklahoma, by reason of its attempt to resuscitate the unconstitu-
tional Oklahoma "grandfather clause."4 This registration law, enacted in 1916 after
the "grandfather clause" was declared unconstitutional, provides for automatic regis-
tration without application of all who voted in the general election of November,
1914,s when the "grandfather clause" was still determinative of the right to vote. All
other electors, qualified before May, 1916, must make personal application during a
single ten-day period in 1916 or be forever disfranchised. The plaintiff, qualified in
zgro, did not vote in November, 1914, nor register in 1916. Therefore, on later applica-
tion in 1934, the defendant-registrar refused to register the plaintiff. On appeal from
a judgment on a directed verdict for the defendants, held, affirmed. There is nothing
on the face of the statute, the court said, to indicate discrimination. Further, the
plaintiff's failure to pursue his statutory remedy in the state courts precludes relief
in the federal courts. 6 Lane v. Wilson et al.7
Neither the Constitution nor the Amendments confer the right to vote, even at
federal elections, on a citizen of the United States.8 But the Fifteenth Amendment
does confer a right on all citizens to be free from discrimination "on account of race,
color, etc."9 and as to federal elections, the right to vote, though determined by state
law, is derived from the Constitution and laws of the United States.xo Although the
Fifteenth Amendment gives Congress power to enforce its provisions by appropriate
legislation, the Supreme Court has restricted this power according to the principles
established under the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, Congress may not legislate
against action by private individuals, but only against state action.,' Hence, under
federal statutes," state election officials who, conforming to a state statute violative
I Since Representatives to Congress were to be elected the election becomes to that extent
a federal election.
2 Okla. Stat. x931, § 5651 et seq.
3 Rev. Stat. 1878, § z979, 8 U.S.C.A. § 43 (1927); Rev. Stat. 1878, § 2004, 8 U.S.C.A.
§ 31 (1927).
4 Okla. Const. art. 3, § 4a, declared unconstitutional in Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S.
347 (x915), overruling Atwater v. Hassett et al., 27 Okla. 292, iii Pac. 802 (1io).
s Okla. L. I916, c. 24, § 4; Okla. Stat. 1931, § 5654.
6 Citing Trudeau v. Barnes, 65 F. (2d) 563 (C.C.A. 5 th 1933), cert. denied 290 U.S. 659
(1933).
7 98 F. (2d) 98o (C.C.A. ioth 1938), cert. granted 59 S. Ct. 249 (1938).
SMinor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. (U.S.) 162, 171 (1874); Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621,
632 (1904).
9 United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 218 (1875); United States v. Cruikshank et a., 92
U.S. 542, 555 (1875). Cf. Neal v. Delaware, io3 U.S. 370, 389 (88o); Ex parte Yarbrough,
11o U.S. 651, 665 (1884). See also Matthews, Legislative and Judicial History of the Fifteenth
Amendment 97-107 (i9o9).
10 Ex parte Yarbrough, iro U.S. 651, 663 (1884); Wiley v. Sinlder, 197 U.S. 58, 63 (I9oO).
, James v. Bowman, io U.S. 127 (9o3).
"See statutes cited note 3 supra.
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of the Fifteenth Amendment, deprive a qualified Negro of the right to vote, are liable
to such citizen for the resulting damages.13 The officer is still considered to be acting
for the state though the supposed authorization for his conduct prove unconstitu-
tional.X4 Unless this were done, the Fifteenth Amendment would be reduced to
empty words.
Another serious restriction on the Fifteenth Amendment and the laws pursuant
thereto is the court-imposed requirement that the discrimination complained of be
solely on account of race, color, etc.'s As a result only the more direct attempts at
race discrimination can be successfully challenged as violating the Fifteenth Amend-
ment. 6 Such disfranchising devices as the poll tax, literacy and understanding tests, 7
residence and property requirements, complicated registration procedure, required
presentation of registration certificates or tax receipts, 8 and disqualification for petty
larceny, wife-beating, etc.-all consciously directed at the Negro's illiteracy, frequent
migrations, carelessness, and low economic and social status-have not been stricken
down under the Fifteenth Amendment due to their apparent application to some poor
and illiterate whites as well.19 A specific example of this is the instant case. The
Oklahoma registration statute, the court held, did not violate the Fifteenth Amend-
ment because on its face it did not discriminate solely between white and Negro
voters. "There were probably also some whites who were qualified to vote at the
1914 election who did not vote. They were on the same footing as to registration as
were the qualified Negroes." 2° But lack of discrimination on the face of the statute is
n6t sufficient to sustain it. In the "grandfather clause" cases the court laid down the
rule that the Amendment has been violated even when the racial discrimination only
'3 Wiley v. Sinkler, 179 U.S. 58 (igoo); Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368 (I9IS); Nixon v.
Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (X927). Note that the doctrine of Hans v. Louisiana, x34 U.S. I
(i89o), is avoided because suit is against the officer individually.
X4 Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1879); C.B. and Q. R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S.
226, 234 (1897). Cf. Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313,321, 334 (1879); Poindexter v. Greenhow,
114 U.S. 270, 285 (1884).
Is United States v. Reese et al., 92 U.S. 214 (1875); United States v. Cruikshank et al., 92
U.S. 542, 556 (1875); Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213 (I898); James v. Bowman, i9o
U.S. 127, 139 (1903).
x6 Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915); Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368 (i915).
17 Note Okla. Stat. 1931, § 5657. "Each qualified elector in this State may be required to
make oath that he is a qualified elector in such precinct, and shall answer under oath any ques-
lions touching his qualifications as an elector and give under oath the information required to
be contained in a registration certificate.... "
IS Note Okla. Stat. 1931, § 5662. "The precinct election board when any elector shall offer
to vote may demand his registration certificate ......" In addition this section gives the
election officials power to refuse a vote if the registration certificate and the register do not
correspond, or if the one seeking to vote cannot satisfy the board that he is the person de-
scribed in the certificate.
1 Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213, 222 (x898). For an excellent treatment of this
problem see Lewinson, Race, Class, and Party 63-68, 79-97, 101-124 (1932) (Appendix II
contains a comprehensive collection of the election laws of twelve Southern States); also Salt,
American Parties and Elections c. II, esp. 36-53 (1927); Harris, Registration of Voters in the
United States 157, 203, 312 (1929).
20 Lane v. Wilson, 98 F. (2d) 98o, 984 (C.C.A. ioth 1938).
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becomes apparent after reading the words in the light of actual facts.21 Since the
Oklahoma statute discriminates between those who voted ft the 1914 election and
those who did not vote in 1914, when the unconstitutional "grandfather clause" was
still in force against the Negroes, it is within the rule, unless the fact that a few whites
were also affected is strong enough to bring the act within the classification of "legal"
disfranchising devices. By considering the effect of the statute in actual operation its
complete discrimination against the Negro and lack of discrimination against whites
would have been obvious.22 Resort to actual administration in preference to specula-
tion as to probable effect is expressly sanctioned in the leading case of Yick Wo v.
Hopkins.23
An equally strong objection to this registration statute can be made under the
Fourteenth Amendment. It may be argued that the classification is very unequal. All
who voted in the 1914 election are automatically registered while those qualified in
'914, but not voting, are given a single ten day period in which to register.4 While
reasonable classification is permissible, arbitrary distinctions without some substantial
basis or reason of public policy cannot be imposed, as they deny equal protection.'s
Further, since the right to vote has been held to be of substantive value, for the illegal
denial of which damages may be awarded, it may be considered a property right.
Thus, a deprivation of this right by arbitrary classification might also be taking
property without due process of law.A
Unreasonable regulations of the elective franchise are also objectionable on state
constitutional grounds, since they deny or abridge the right to vote given by the con-
stitution.27 The Oklahoma constitution confers the right to vote on citizens having
specified qualifications.28 Even though permission to enact a registration law is
granted by the constitution, as in Oklahoma,29 still that law must be reasonable, uni-
form, and impartial, and not directly or indirectly intended to abridge the right to
vote. 30 A Michigan statute providing only five days to register each year was held
" See cases cited in note 16 supra.
-See i5th Census of United States, v. 3, pt. 2, 6o3, where table 21 shows the Negro popula-
tion of the county of the plaintiff's residence to be 6,753. The registration records of Wagoner
County, Oklahoma, v. i and 2, show two Negroes registered during the period 1916-36 (as
cited in Transcript of Record of instant case).
23 i8 U.S. 356, 373 (1886); also see Mills v. Green, 67 Fed. 818, 830 (C.C. S.C. 1895),
reversed on other grounds in 69 Fed. 852 (C.C.A. 4th .a895), and appeal dismissed in 159
U.S. 651 (1895). Cf .Williams v. Mississippi, I 70 U.S. 213 (i898), distinguished by Matthews,
op. cit. supra note 9, at 122.
'4 Except for those who can show absence, illness, or unavoidable misfortune, who may
register "at any time after the tenth day of May, z96, up to and including the thirtieth day
of June, z96 ..... " Okla. Stat. 1931, § 5654.
2s Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 1i8 U.S. 356, 370 (i886); Southern Ry. Co. v. Greene, 26 U.S.
400, 417 (I9IO); Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 337 (1921).
2 Willoughby, Constitutional Law 638 (2d ed. X929).
27 Capen v. Foster, 12 Pick. (Mass.) 485, 489 (1832); also 2 Cooley, Constitutional Limita-
tions 1370 (8th ed. 1927) cases cited note 2.
2' Okla. Const. art. 3, § i and art. 1, §6.
"9 Okla. Const. art. 3, § 6.
30 Morris e al. v. Powell, 125 Ind. 28I, 290, 25 N.E. 22X, 223 (i89o); Pope v. Williams, 98
Md. 59, 66, 56 Atl. 543, 545 (I9O3), aff'd 193 U.S. 621 (1904).
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unconstitutional.3r The Oklahoma act gives but ten days during the voter's life. This
state question was properly before the court in the instant case since the constitutional-
ity of this particular statute has never been passed on by the supreme court of Okla-
homa.32
If the United States Supreme Court should hold the instant act unconstitutional
on any of the aforementioned grounds, the question of separability arises. The objec-
tionable sections appear to be so integral a part of the entire registration scheme that
it must stand or fall as a unit. Striking out both the sections objected to by the plain-
tiffs3 would not rectify the statute. Registration of a voter such as Lane still could not
be accepted under the only other appropriate section, since that section is limited to
"any person who may become qualified ... after ... May, 1916."34 Lane was
qualified in igio. To remove all objection would entail a more extensive revision than
the Court customarily attempts. Striking down the entire act leaves only the con-
stitutional provisions3s as determinative of the right to vote. This raises a neat juris-
dictional problem. If there was no registration requirement, was any damage suf-
fered for the refusal to register? Or must the plaintiff show a denial of the right to vote
before obtaining damages? In a like situation where the plaintiff asked an injunction
to compel his registration the Supreme Court refused to take jurisdiction on the ground
that to grant the injunction would make the court a party to an unlawful scheme.36
These objections should not apply against an action at law, but a court seeking to
avoid the delicate Negro question might employ them.37 Such a decision would be
directly in the teeth of the ruling that a plaintiff may not challenge the constitutional-
ity of a registration statute without having sought to register.38 In analogous situa-
tions it has been held that the law will not require a citizen to undergo risk of criminal
prosecution39 to test the constitutionality of a statute.40
The circuit court suggested another jurisdictional ground for dismissing the case-
the plaintiff's failure to use the statutory remedy of appeal to the state courts. The
only support for this view is a recent fifth circuit decision4l whereas there is strong au-
3P Att'y General v. Detroit, 78 Mich. 545, 44 N.W. 388 (z889). Accord: Monroe v. Collins,
17 Ohio St. 666 (1867); Daggett v. Hudson, 43 Ohio St. 548, 3 N.E. 538 (x885); State v.
Corner, 22 Neb. 265, 34 N.W. 499 (1887).
32 Davis v. Wallace, 257 U.S. 478, 482 (1922). 34 Okla. Stat. 1931, § 5659.
33 Okla. Stat. 1931, §§ 5654, 5657. 35 Okla. Const. art. 3, § i.
36 Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475, 487 (1903) (note that Holmes, J., reserves judgment as to
the applicability of these objections to an action at law). Also see Matthews op. cit. supra
note 9, at 125.
37 Mills v. Green, 69 Fed. 852 (C.C.A. 4th 1895) on appeal 159 U.S. 6,i (I895); Jones v.
Montague, 194 U.S. 147 (19o4). Also note how the Supreme Court evaded race questions
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Collins, Fourteenth Amendment and the Negro Race
Question, 45 Am. Law. Rev. 830 (1z1).
38 Wiley v. Sinkler, 179 U.S. 58, 66 (iioo).
39 In Oklahoma illegal voting is a felony. Okla. Stat. 1931, § 5842. Also the Const. art. 3,
§ 6 prohibits voting by one not registered. See Munger et al. v. Town of Watonga, io6 Okla.
78, 233 Pac. 211 (1925) (vote of an unregistered voter is void).
40 EX parte Young 209 U.S. 123, 146-148 (igo8).
41 Trudeau v. Barnes, 65 F. (2d) 563 (C.C.A. 5th 1933).
RECENT CASES
thority to the effect that the jurisdiction of a federal court over a cause of action aris-
ing under federal law cannot be limited by judicial remedies provided by state stat-
utes.42
The practical wisdom, however, of avoiding a decision on Negro suffrage can be
appreciated. Striking down discriminatory statutes has done little toward giving
Negroes a vote.43 The ballot, not the judiciary, is the effective means of enforcing po-
litical rights. Nevertheless, without a vote, the Negro depends for the protection of
his rights on the federal judiciary,44 who are in a very delicate position. They know
that to sanction Negro-suffrage may give the Negro the balance of power in many
instances and alienate the Southern whites.4s They also must recognize that the
principle of "equal rights regardless of race" is a part of the Constitution, made so
at the cost of a civil war. Perhaps the present strong feeling against "race persecu-
tion" affords an opportunity for another46 Supreme Court decision condemning race
discrimination in the United States, this time as to suffrage. A firm stand against
arbitrary registration laws may hasten the trend of increased expenditures for Negro
education and health protection,47 and may result in time in the acceptance by the
South of an intelligent Negro vote, in spite of the ever-present bogey of Negro balance
of power.
Constitutional Law-Equal Protection of the Laws-Exclusion of Negro Law Stu-
dent from State University-[Federal].-A Negro citizen of Missouri, admittedly
qualified, was refused admission to the Law School of the University of Missouri
solely on the ground of color. The State of Missouri maintains a separate university
for Negroes which does not provide legal instruction. A Missouri statutex authorized
the board of curators to arrange for scholarships to the university of any adjacent
state for taking any course of subjects provided at the University of Missouri but not
taught at the Negro university.2 The petitioner refused to avail himself of the scholar-
ship and brought mandamus to compel his admission to the state university law
school. The State Supreme Court refused the writ. Reversing the decision, the
United States Supreme Court with two judges dissenting, held that the out-of-state
4'Chicot County v. Sherwood, 148 U.S. 529, 534 (1893).
43Lewinson, op. cit. supra note i9, at 59.
44 Black Justice, i4o Nation 497 (May, 1935).
4s Sait, op. cit. supra note i9, at 55; Lewinson, op. cit. supra note Ig esp. 46-105, 157,
176-193; Monnet, Latest Phase of Negro Disfranchisement, 26 Harv. L. Rev. 42, 61 (i912).
4O State of Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 59 S. Ct. 232 (1938). Noted 6 Univ. Chi. L.
Rev. 301 (1939).
47 Stewart, A Negro Looks at the South, Reader's Digest, 55-57 (Jan., i939).
* Mo. Rev. Stat. 1929, c. 57, art. ig § 9622.
*Although the statute does not expressly exclude Negroes from the State University, the
state court interpreted the scholarship provision as expressing the legislative intention to do so.
The respondent in the instant case sought to press the point that the scholarship arrange-
ment was temporary, pending the establishment of a law department. But the Supreme Court
held that since the curators were vested with discretion as to when to provide such facilities,
"the discrimination may continue for an indefinite period," and "may not be excused by what
is called its temporary character.'! 59 S. Ct. 232, 237 (1938).
